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Introduction
The question of the power of the gods, especially as it relates to a more or less abstract fate, has been considered and discussed many times, in different cultures and contexts, by priests, philosophical schools, and in the course of various cults. To this was later 
added the question of the free will of human beings. Indeed, we look back on a long tradition 
of literature over a wide range of cultures that wonders about human possibility, the inevitabil-
ity of fate, the inexplicability of events, and the miraculous workings of fate. In the ancient cul-
tures of the larger Mediterranean, we find almost as many opinions regarding the power of the 
gods and its limits and the existence of such a thing as fate and its relation to the gods, as there 
are cultures, if not, indeed, more.1 Why was my child born disfigured? Why can I not marry 
the partner I desire? Why were our champions unable to avert disaster to our community? 
Why did we lose a fleet at Drepanum? Why did I dream of the calamity before it happened? 
Most Mediterranean cultures developed their own terms and concepts that would allow 
them to provide explanations for otherwise inexplicable events and phenomena. Men and 
gods, personal and impersonal powers exerted an influence over the lives of men, which, de-
pending on situation, social belonging, political circumstances and, of course, religious tradi-
tions, acted directly or indirectly, constantly or occasionally on the lives of men. Was man free 
in his decisions? Did the gods determine his fate? If so, to what extent? And whose fate? Or 
were the gods also subject to a higher power which restricted their own abilities to act, to in-
tervene, to save or to condemn? If so, how are we to understand the relationship between god/
the gods and fate? Were they, indeed, one? Was fate itself a deity? Or was fate superior to the 
gods, an abstract power that the gods were as much subjected to as men were? 
The present collection of papers looks at a number of conceptions regarding fate and the 
gods and their relationship to one another, attempting to address some of the problems as 
well as possible solutions found for them in their relevant cultures. The focus is on the ancient 
cultures of the Mediterranean, in this volume: Egypt, Greece and Rome. 
1 The present papers were first presented at a symposion of the Research Training Group 896 “Images of the 
Gods – Images of God – Images of the World: Polytheism and Monotheism in the Ancient World” at Georg 
August University, Gottingen. Six parallel projects researched ancient notions of fate in different contexts. The 
results have now been published in Elisabeth Begemann 2012. Schicksal als Argument. Ciceros Rede vom fatum 
in der späten Republik. PawB 37. Stuttgart: Steiner. Gösta Gabriel 2014. Enuma Elis. Weg zu einer globalen 
Weltordnung. Pragmatik, Struktur und Semantik des babylonischen‚ Lieds auf Marduk‘. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
Matthias Gerth 2013. Bildungsvorstellungen im 5. Jahrhundert n. Chr.: Macrobius, Martianus Capella und 
Sidonius Apollinaris. Berlin: de Gruyter. Astrid Khariouzov 2013. Prodigien in der römischen Königszeit: Eine 
motivgeschichtliche und narratologische Analyse im 1. Buch des Livius. Berlin: Frank & Timme. Anne Pinkepank 
2012. Von Tyche verfolgt, von Eros gehasst: Schicksalsmächte und die Macht der Liebe in Charitons Kallirhoe. Diss. 
Göttingen 2012.
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Various levels must be taken into consideration. There is, first of all, the level of the supra-
human, the numinous, reflecting the connection between agents and powers to one another, 
their relations and the way they interact. For the cultures here considered, we find that provi-
dence, fate and divine power are impersonal rather than personal notions. Fate, providence 
and extensive power (even omnipotence) may become divine attributes or may have numinous 
qualities of their own, even divine rank. Is there, then, an area in which the properties of per-
sonally defined deities are left undefined and which encourages the agent to test the limits of 
that undefined, numinous potential? In comparing different cultures and their religious tradi-
tions, we can outline different models of dependence, synergies, and influences, as well as of 
exclusion between god/the gods or divine powers and other numinous concepts. 
A second level is that of the intermediary, in which divine and human spheres interact, 
in which the higher manifests itself and to which the lower directs its questions, expecting 
guidance and direction. The focus is as much on the interaction in the divine sphere as on 
the interaction of men, gods, and fate or destiny that it possibly a distinct power next to, or 
above, the gods. Divination and the predictability of future events are the relevant topics, i.e., 
the attempt of man to gain knowledge of what is to come and of the operating mechanisms 
of his world, by employing the multiple forms of divination at his disposal, and, in a second 
step, to become active himself in order to influence fate towards a better outcome. In this 
context, we find spontaneous declarations of divine will and future events on the one hand; 
but how can these spontaneous declarations be interpreted as divine? And how was man sup-
posed to make sense of them? On the other hand, human agents take control, and ask for 
palpable clues. But how do they recognize them, and how are they able to interpret them, let 
alone correctly? 
The subject of the third level of inquiry is that of human experience and reflection. How 
did people in antiquity think and speak about, or reflect on, fate? If man becomes an object of 
foreign control, did he suffer from his own powerlessness? Did he seek ways to come to terms 
with it? Did he seek to circumvent his own fate and the powers that define and control it? Or 
did he seek ways simply to deal with it? These reflections and the experience of the world as 
guided by fate found their way into numerous writings of different genres. One of the ques-
tions which must be addressed in this context is, how did people experience these numinous 
powers? Were they understood to be benign, even benevolent powers directing and guiding 
the life of the subject? Or were they rather negative, malign powers, threatening the safety and 
prosperity of the subject? 
What the present publication aims for is not a comprehensive compilation of how fate and 
divine will in its relation to fate was understood and dealt with in the cultures of the ancient 
Mediterranean world. It cannot be, as one important area, monotheism, has not been included 
in this volume. The focus is rather on a polytheistic world in which god/the gods and fate 
must needs be understood as two distinct qualities, a world in which no power can a priori be 
understood as all-powerful, all-knowing and all-encompassing. 
What is aimed for can rather be nothing more than a glimpse at different attempts to 
come to terms with the contingency experienced in the lives of people whose everyday expe-
rience was peopled with a multitude of powers that could be offended, pleased, petitioned, 
that could be asked for guidance, favors and protection, for justice and revenge. A multitude 
of powers whose intent and purpose could never be fully known or understood, no matter 
how hard one might try. Under these conditions, what safety, what security was there? And 
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how was one to live a life that was as desperately uncertain in view of the powers that may or 
may not direct it? 
In looking beyond the borders of one culture and one discipline and extending the chrono-
logical frame, this publication hopes to outline selective connections and differences, helping 
to understand the shared and the distinctive notions of ancient cultures in their multiple forms 
and variations. 
The literary basis for a publication as this one, regarding the notions of fate in the ancient 
world, is already quite extensive.2 What is missing, however, are publications going beyond the 
boundaries of one culture. One publication in this direction is the comprehensive monograph 
by Martin West, The East Face of Helicon,3 which discussed the interdependencies between 
classical antiquity and the ancient Near East. A useful introduction to the varied conceptions 
in the different cultures of the ancient world is the published version of the lecture series Vorse-
hung, Schicksal und göttliche Macht,4 which compiles thirteen contributions from different dis-
ciplines and their reflections on fate. The authors take a two-fold approach, of concentration 
on a specific culture on the one hand, of comparison between cultures on the other. 
It is this topic and this approach which is continued in the present publication. It discusses 
the three levels outlined above, of nature and power of the gods, of fate and man, so that simi-
larities and differences can be clearly detected. 
The beginning is made by four contributions from the field of Egyptology. In her first 
contribution, Alexandra von Lieven discusses the ways in which contingency was dealt with 
in Ancient Egypt, by introducing different forms of oracles which were used by various 
groups for specific ends: whether it was a matter of private decision making, a matter of 
temple diplomacy, or a matter of state justification, recurrence to the will of the or a specific 
deity served not only to alleviate uncertainty, but to establish unassailable authority. Whether 
these oracles came in the form of procession oracles, thereby taking place in an environment 
of highest visibility in the public sphere, or in the form of ticket oracles, which substitute 
“yes/no” formulae by conditionals, Egyptian oracles enabled the questioner not only to gain 
some form of certainty, but to partake in the deity’s greater wisdom and knowledge of past, 
present and future. 
In two related contributions, Alexandra von Lieven and Christoffer Theis then discuss a 
specific divinatory practice, hemerology. First, von Lieven introduces the practice and its most 
relevant sources in the Egyptian context, underlining the chronological extent of the practice 
well into late antiquity, as well as its uses in everyday life, advising on the cautions for every 
day of the year. While on the one hand the gods are claimed as the authors of these divinatory 
texts, informing the reader of the “quality” of any given day (i.e., “good”, “bad” or “uncer-
tain”), and must therefore be understood as originators of events to occur, the often found for-
mula of “If A (occurs), then say B” in the calendars leaves plenty of room to avoid misfortunes, 
even with regard to birth oracles. With an eye on the substitute subject, von Lieven comes to 
the conclusion that certain events must happen, but it is not yet certain as to whom they will 
2 Cf. Ahn, Kratz 2004; Bergmeier 1999; Bergjan 2002; Bobzien 1998; Dietrich 1965; Dietrich 1994; 
Dihle 1982; Eliade 1953; Frede 2011; Gladigow 1981; Holm 1969; Morenz, Müller 1960; Kreter 
2006; Lambert 1972; Martin 1982; Nesselrath 1992; Olson 1988; Ringren (ed.) 1967; Ritter, Feldmei-
er, Schoberth, Altner 1997; Schrage 2005; von der Gablentz 168.  
3 West 1997.
4 Kratz, Spieckermann 2008.
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happen. Fate, then, is again debatable: the gods may determine what is to happen, but they 
can be influence and appeased and, as it were, change fate.
Joachim Quack then examines the nature of fate in demotic Egypt. He identifies three 
areas, in which fate manifests itself, which are the areas of divination, of life teachings (“Leb-
enslehren”), and of Isis as the ruler of fate. He shows clearly that Egypt did not possess a fatal-
istic concept of fate, but that the gods remained the highest instance, and that the human actor 
was quite able to (ritually) alter his or her fate – again: depending on the grace of the gods. The 
concept of fate was thus rather another element to create order in society, as the notion that 
fate was a punishment that could be “sated” shows. The human actor was encouraged to follow 
the rules of society (and the gods) in order to avoid a negative fate. 
The contribution by Christof Theis then discusses a specific example of a calendar di-
scussed above by von Lieven, Pap. Heidelberg Inv. Kopt. 236. Though only fragmentary in 
nature, this calendar shows that those who would refer to it would know exactly what to do 
and what not to do on a certain day, including whether the children born to them on those 
days would turn out successful and healthy, or poor and of ill repute. In these terms, a person’s 
life must be understood as predetermined from the beginning, as success of whatever action 
is contingent on the day the event occurs. And whereas a person might have some influence 
over his own actions, i.e., whether to do business or go to court on a certain day, the crucial 
day of one’s birth is, and must be, removed from human influence and remains in the hands 
of higher powers and their determining will.5 However, Theis stresses that the calendar was of 
local importance at most, since the days noted as good days for some activities were noted as 
bad days for the same activities in other, comparable, manuscripts. The focus is clearly on the 
individual, giving them the opportunity to come to terms with contingency by making the 
right, calendrical, choices for their actions and accepting what cannot be altered. Changing 
one’s fate could then be as easy as looking at a different, rival calendar.
Is nothing really fixed, then? In his discussion of the Homeric epics, Efstratios Sarischoulis 
comes to different conclusions. Counter to the common notion of “Homeric fate”, he pos-
tulates that the Homeric epics indeed do not portray man as a helpless puppet in a cosmos 
ruled by either fate or the gods. He rather proposes that the Homeric epics follow a stringent 
sequence of action/reaction: rather than assuming that the lives of the Homeric heroes are 
fated either by an impersonal fate or by the will of the gods, he views both gods and men as 
agents in the unfolding of events. Their actions, however caused, have consequences, either 
good or bad, which lead to further actions and reactions. Whatever happens, “Homeric fate”, 
is, in his reading, a chain of natural consequences of the decisions taken by gods and men, 
without either ever losing the ability to choose differently, thereby creating a different outcome 
to events. Ultimately, says Sarischoulis, man is responsible for his own fate, both in his actions, 
and in his relation to the gods and the moral order: it is man himself who determines his fate, 
though the gods may influence his decisions. 
The next two papers discuss fate and divine will in a Roman context. First, Elisabeth Be-
gemann looks at the ways in which an argument of fate and pre-determination is used in the 
Ciceronian oeuvre, not only in the philosophical context, but also in the public speeches. It is 
shown that Cicero does not allow for a fate that eradicates human responsibility, as his basic 
assumption was, and must be, that a moral and functioning society can only exist under the 
5 See also Sarischoulis in this volume.
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premise that the individual is responsible for all his actions. At the same time, Cicero upholds 
that the Roman res publica and its fate was bound to the will of the gods, who act, in this func-
tion, as determining and guardian powers of the Roman community.
Christoph Schubert then discusses the Senecan notion of fate, as it manifests itself in his 
use of the terms fatum and fortuna in the works of the Stoic philosopher. By looking at select 
exempla, Schubert finds a coherent use of both terms and concepts that, while recognizing 
divine providence and exhorting man (i.e., the wise man, the Stoic philosopher) to accept his 
fate, still describes a world view in which individual accountability is upheld. Though Seneca 
accepts the Stoic doctrine of fate, the politically active philosopher did not seem to struggle 
with it or its implications, but rather provides for his readers guidelines for both practical ap-
plicability and the discussion of finer points of the doctrine. 
The problem, or notion, of fate is one that remains a subject of importance and virulent 
discussion throughout history. It is telling that, in a rationalized and science-driven world as 
the Western world today, neuro-science of all disciplines holds that man is not free in his will, 
whereas, as Schubert rightly notes, “the basic assumption that there is no determinism by fate 
or like powers […] would preclude accountability for actions and possibility of punishment.”6 
While operating under the assumption that our decisions are indeed our own, we might yet 
be subject to powers that determine who we are, what we do and how our lives will unfold – 
whether we call them neurons, gods or fate. 
The papers here presented were aided by the input of many. Thanks must be extended 
to the participants of the Gottingen symposion for input and discussion, as well as Prof. Dr. 
Hermann Spieckermann and Prof. Dr. Reinhardt G. Kratz, Gottingen, the directors of the 
group. Much gratitude is also due to Prof. Dr. Jörg Rüpke, Erfurt, for his input, and advice. 
I gratefully acknowledge both the anonymous readers for their valuable comments on the 
papers and the editors of the “Mythos” series, Prof. Dr. Corinne Bonnet, Toulouse, Prof. Dr. 
Nicola Cusumano, Palermo, and Dr. Daniela Bonanno, for accompanying the process of this 







6 Schubert, p. 128 in this publication. Cf. also Cic. fat. 40 with Begemann 2012.
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